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.Second, this has led to a drift-ing and neglected nuclear weapons policy and a sense of bureaucratic inertia.Third, this has been exacerbated by the absence of bipartisan consensus on thelong-term future of nuclear weapons policy that has stymied implementation ofthe 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). 130 Domestic politics and nuclear policyThe executiveThe status quo outcome of the 1994 NPR provides a compelling example of theabsence of senior-level attention and how such absence can reinforce the viewsof an entrenched bureaucracy.When the Clinton administration came to powerin 1993 many observers expected significant change in nuclear weapons policyfor a number of reasons.The Democratic-controlled Congress that had termi-nated or curtailed a number of major nuclear weapons programmes underGeorge H.W.Bush now had a Democrat in the White House.Clinton supporteda ban on nuclear testing and further nuclear reduction and appointed Congress-man Les Aspin, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, as Secretary ofDefense.Aspin had argued for major changes to what he considered an outdatednuclear weapons policy in a 1992 paper entitled From Deterrence to Denuking:Dealing with Proliferation in the 1990s.44 Statements by Aspin and AssistantSecretary of Defense for International Security Policy Ashton Carter suggestedthat the possibility of a nuclear weapons-free world should be taken seriously.Inaddition Energy Secretary Hazel O Leary s openness initiative seemed to signala shift away from Cold War practices and the secrecy surrounding nuclearweapons policy (these issues are examined in chapter four).When the 1994 NPR was announced many who favoured change consideredit the moment of maximum opportunity for the president to establish a nuclearlegacy consonant with emerging security challenges and make a significantshift in policy.45 There was considerable disappointment when the NPR codifiedthe status quo advocated by the DOD bureaucracy and JCS and previously setout in the SAC and STRATCOM force structure studies in the early 1990s.Critics have argued that there was little or no leadership desire to change thedirection of nuclear weapons policy from the Secretary of Defense, NationalSecurity Council, STRATCOM, JCS or the President.According to Nolan,Clinton and his close advisers never indicated that they had a stake in theoutcome of the review and Aspin s resignation in December 1993 significantlyreduced the level of senior political interest in the review.46 The NPR was not apriority for Aspin s replacement, William Perry, or his deputy, John Deutch.Instead issues such as Bosnia and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programwith Russia dominated DOD s agenda.47 Without senior-level interest, leader-ship and attention it was almost inevitable that the commitment to a status quoposture largely based on the previous chapter s first idea set and firmly linked toCold War understandings of nuclear weapons policy would continue to domi-nate nuclear policy and planning.48 Nolan surmises that this vacuum in senior-level leadership and White House authority conspired with the reflexivereluctance of career officials to accept unfamiliar concepts that tested deeplyheld beliefs and entrenched ways of conducting policy.49 White House reluc-tance to challenge the JCS and DOD bureaucracy was compounded by Clinton sdifficult relationship with the military from the very beginning of his administra-tion over the issue of homosexuals in the military and military intervention inSomalia.50 With hindsight it was clear that any serious review and change of Domestic politics and nuclear policy 131policy must be presidentially ordained and overseen and certified by senior mili-tary officials who are convinced of the need for change.51The lack of senior-level political interest continued after the NPR.52 Clintonhad little desire to challenge the military and judged nuclear weapons to be anissue not worth spending political capital on, which, as Halperin argues, shouldbe carefully husbanded and used shrewdly for priority issues.53 Nuclearweapons were viewed as a residue of the Cold War to be cleaned up rather thanan issue on which to take new initiatives.Instead, issues such as Haiti, Somalia,Bosnia, non-proliferation and relations with Russia and China were much highernational security priorities.What political capital Clinton wanted to spend onnuclear weapons policy issues was spent on extension of the NPT in 1995 andnegotiation of the CTBT in 1996.54 The George W
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