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Soviet Studies 37(4): 524 34.Weber, Max.1922/1968.Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology,ed.Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich.3 vols.New York: Bedminster.Afterwordmark harri sonIn this book we have looked at some issues of Soviet defense and thedefense industry under Stalin, using simple tools of historical economics andpolitical economy.What have we learned?Defense issues were at the core of Stalin s dictatorship (Chapters 1 and 2).Wecannot understand how Stalin s dictatorship came into being, and how heruled, unless we take into account the active role played by military andmilitary-industrial interests as well as the importance of the armed forces inStalin s system of political power.Stalin wanted military power to defendhimself against external threats.At the same time, the Soviet military authori-ties supported his program of forced industrialization and transition to acommand system.Once he had become dictator, however, Stalin did not want, and came tofear, strong military and industrial leaders with the independence to stand upto him or the potential to join against him (Chapter 3).In Stalin s time the lastof these were the heavy industry minister Sergo Ordzhonikidze, whom Stalindrove to suicide in 1936, and marshal of the Red Army Mikhail Tukhachev-skii, executed in 1937.World War II threw up new leaders of the military andeconomic fronts; afterward, Stalin humiliated, imprisoned, or executed anumber of them.Stalin was able to rule, therefore, without having to concedeanything to the claims of a powerful, self-interested military-industrial lobby.255256 AfterwordThe Soviet defense sector, although organized, was not monolithic (Chap-ters 3, 4, 5, and 6).In theory everyone in the defense sector might have gainedby cooperating to share the proceeds of privilege.In practice there were verti-cal and horizontal fault lines everywhere that kept them at odds with eachother and limited cooperation.Probably this was not an accident.It wasStalin s system of rule to keep the Army and Industry divided from each other,and to structure the incentives facing them so that they gained more frommutual rivalry, including shirking mutual obligations and cheating each other,than from setting out to cooperate
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