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. Too often,he worried, American money was dispensed with a secular liberal presump-tion that human needs could be met by material assistance alone.Moreover,he criticized the United States Information Agency (USIA) and Voice ofAmerica (VOA) for esteeming religion for sheer purposes of propaganda.While lauding Elton Trueblood s leadership in incorporating religion into59Henry, Human Rights in an Age of Tyranny, CT, 4 February 1957, 20 22.60Henry, Spiritual-Moral Unity Wanes in United Nations, CT, 4 March 1957, 21 22.61Henry, UN: Town Meeting? Or Tragedy? , CT, 1 April 1957, 20 22.UNITY DISSOLVED: PROTESTANTS AND FOREIGN POLICY, 1953 1960 87USIA programs, Henry was appalled at a recent bulletin that had effectivelyaffirmed Mohammed as a true prophet and Islam as an admirable faith. Non-Christian religion is flattered and encouraged, and the tax-supported policyof the American government casts weight against the Christian witness ofAmerican foreign missionaries. To Henry, this smacked of reducing religionto what is diplomatically serviceable rather than truly respecting spiritualpriorities. 62 The Cold War did shift Henry s thinking towards other faiths inone important area, in which he also seemed to depart from his more stridentcolleagues at the NAE.He informed CT s board that he did not considerCatholicism to be as much of a threat as communism, for despite Rome sreligious totalitarianism, it stands on the side of an objective moral order andis anti-communist. 63A CT survey of Protestant ministers on the eve of the 1956 election rein-forced the new journal s interest in foreign affairs.Noting that the pastorsresponding favored Eisenhower over Adlai Stevenson by a margin of eight toone (though CT s readership, more conservative theologically and politically,should hardly be taken as a representative sample of clerical opinion), theeditorial speculated that Eisenhower s popularity sprang from his identifica-tion with an attitude of faith in God and in objective moral norms more thansheer party considerations. When asked about policy concerns, almost everycategory of clergy focused on an improved foreign policy as the great-est imperative. Pastors divided sharply over whether to increase or decreaseinvolvement in the UN, and while most favored reducing foreign aid, a notice-able minority favored increasing it.More generally, pastors overwhelminglyadvocated a more aggressive spiritual-moral international policy, thoughagain, aside from discontent with mere realpolitik and power-balancing, therewas little agreement on just what form this more idealistic foreign policywould take.In a none too subtle dig at the mainline denominational hierar-chies, the editorial concluded that the poll dramatizes the risk of attemptingto express the position of a denomination.on political and economicissues. 64 And if any officials in the Eisenhower Administration were payingattention, they probably concluded that they needed to bolster their effortsto frame American foreign policy in spiritual terms.American churchgoerswere listening.62Henry, The Spirit of Foreign Policy, CT, 29 April, 20 22.For more on Trueblood, see chapterseven of this book.63Henry, May 28, 1957 Report to the Board; CT Papers, Box 1, Folder 3; BGCA.At the time mostProtestants regarded Catholicism as another faith entirely.64Editorial, Where Do We Go From Here? CT, 12 November 1956.88 PART ONEvThe American government s geopolitical strategy may have been most focusedon the Soviet Union, but American Christians showed disproportionate con-cern for China.Not that they disregarded the USSR; indeed, most AmericanChristians would likely have agreed that Soviet communism posed the gravestthreat to their nation and to the world.Yet China retained a curious, enchant-ing fixation in the hearts of many Americans to a degree that outweighed itsstrategic importance at least its importance in the minds of most policy-makers.The long history of American missionaries active in China, its exoticstatus as a distant, mysterious civilization, and the revolutionary ferment ofChina s recent past all combined to make this Eastern land endlessly fascinat-ing.Shared passion did not imply shared agreement, however.The U.S. Chinarelationship engendered some of the most heated debates and bitter divisionswithin American Protestantism.These only served to make China all themore problematic for policy-makers, who dreaded touching this proverbial third rail, knowing full well that whatever position they took, they riskedincurring the spiritual indignation of some sector of Christendom.Evangelicals in general fiercely opposed the Chinese communist govern-ment, maintaining unswerving loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuom-intang (KMT).The Chiangs profession of Christian faith no doubt accountedfor much of their appeal.Bell, a former medical missionary to China, wroteto Madame Chiang in 1956 describing himself and Billy Graham as someof General Chiang s most ardent admirers here in America.You and theGeneral are constantly in our prayers and thoughts, and we thank God foryour clear Christian testimony and for your unswerving stand for righteous-ness. 65Chiang was not the only Nationalist leader who identified himself as aChristian.Bell and Henry cultivated a relationship with Hollington K.Tong,the KMT Ambassador to the United States, and published several articles byTong in CT.After one meeting with Tong, Bell wrote appreciatively, I foundin you a true Christian brother, a fellowship which bridges all else. 66 Tongfor his part seems to have realized that these evangelicals formed a vital baseof support for the KMT government.In one article for CT on Christianityin China, Tong declared that most of the important government leaders65September 4, 1956 letter from Bell to Madame Chiang Kai-shek; Bell Papers, Box 18, Folder15; BGCA.66June 7, 1956 letter from Bell to Tong; Bell Papers, Box 52, Folder 17; BGCA.UNITY DISSOLVED: PROTESTANTS AND FOREIGN POLICY, 1953 1960 89on Taiwan are professing Christians
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