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. 1.The dependence of Trincomalee upon the English fleet in this campaign affords an excellentillustration of the embarrassment and false position in which a navy finds itself when the defence of itsseaports rests upon it.This bears upon a much debated point of the present day, and is worthy the study ofthose who maintain, too unqualifiedly, that the best coast defence is a navy.In one sense this is doubtlesstrue, to attack the enemy abroad is the best of defences; but in the narrow sense of the word defence it isnot true.Trincomalee unfortified was simply a centre round which Hughes had to revolve like a tetheredanimal; and the same will always happen under like conditions. Suffren having sighted Hughes's fleet at Madras, February 15, anchored his own four miles to the northward.Considering the enemy's line, supported by the batteries, to be too strong for attack, he again got under way atfour P.M.and stood south.Hughes also weighed, standing to the southward all that night under easy sail, andat daylight found that the enemy's squadron had separated from the convoy, the ships of war being abouttwelve miles east, while the transports were nine miles southwest, from him.This dispersal is said to havebeen due to the carelessness of the French frigates, which did not keep touch of the English.Hughes at onceprofited by it, chasing the convoy, knowing that the line-of-battle ships must follow.His copper-bottomedships came up with and captured six of the enemy, five of which were English prizes.The sixth carried threehundred troops with military stores.Hughes had scored a point.CHAPTER XII.EVENTS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1781.-SUFFREN SAILS FROM 194 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783Suffren of course followed in a general chase, and by three P.M.four of his best sailers were two or threemiles from the sternmost English ships.Hughes's ships were now much scattered, but not injudiciously so, forthey joined by signal at seven P.M.Both squadrons stood to the southeast during the night, under easy sail.At daylight of the 17th the date of the first of four actions fought between these two chiefs within sevenmonths the fleets were six or eight miles apart, the French bearing north-northeast from the English.Thelatter formed line-ahead on the port tack, with difficulty, owing to the light winds and frequent calms.Admiral Hughes explains that he hoped to weather the enemy by this course so as to engage closely, countingprobably on finding himself to windward when the sea-breeze made.The wind continuing light, but withfrequent squalls, from north-northeast, the French, running before it, kept the puffs longer and neared theEnglish rapidly, Suffren's intention to attack the rear being aided by Hughes's course.The latter finding hisrear straggling, bore up to line abreast, retreating to gain time for the ships to close on the centre.Thesemovements in line abreast continued till twenty minutes before four P.M., when, finding he could not escapeattack on the enemy's terms, Hughes hauled his wind on the port tack and awaited it.Whether by his own faultor not, he was now in the worst possible position, waiting for an attack by a superior force at its pleasure.Therear ship of his line, the Exeter, was not closed up; and there appears no reason why she should not havebeen made the van, by forming on the starboard tack, and thus bringing the other ships up to her.The method of Suffren's attack is differently stated by him and by Hughes, but the difference is in detail only;the main facts are certain.Hughes says the enemy steered down on the rear of our line in an irregular doubleline- abreast, in which formation they continued till the moment of collision, when three of the enemy'sships in the first line bore right down upon the 'Exeter,' while four more of their second line, headed by the'Heros,' in which M.de Suffren had his flag, hauled along the outside of the first line toward our centre.Atfive minutes past four the enemy's three ships began their fire upon the 'Exeter,' which was returned by herand her second ahead; the action became general from our rear to our centre, the commanding ship of theenemy, with three others of their second line, leading down on our centre, yet never advancing farther thanopposite to the 'Superbe,' our centre ship, with little or no wind and some heavy rain during the engagement.Under these circumstances, the enemy brought eight of their best ships to the attack of five of ours, as the vanof our line, consisting of the 'Monmouth,' 'Eagle,' 'Burford,' and 'Worcester,' could not be brought into actionwithout tacking on the enemy, for which there was not enough wind.Here we will leave them, and give Suffren's account of how he took up his position.In his report to theMinister of Marine he says: I should have destroyed the English squadron, less by superior numbers than by the advantageous dispositionin which I attacked it.I attacked the rear ship and stood along the English line as far as the sixth.I thus madethree of them useless, so that we were twelve against six.I began the fight at half-past three in the afternoon,taking the lead and making signal to form line as best could be done; without that I would not have engaged.At four I made signal to three ships to double on the enemy's rear, and to the squadron to approach withinpistol-shot.This signal, though repeated, was not executed.I did not myself give the example, in order that Imight hold in check the three van ships, which by tacking would have doubled on me.However, except the'Brilliant,' which doubled on the rear, no ship was as close as mine, nor received as many shots. The principal point of difference in the two accounts is, that Suffren asserts that his flag-ship passed along thewhole English line, from the rear to the sixth ship; while Hughes says the French divided into two lines,which, upon coming near, steered, one on the rear, the other on the centre, of his squadron.The latter wouldbe the better manoeuvre; for if the leading ship of the attack passed, as Suffren asserts, along the enemy's linefrom the rear to the sixth, she should receive in succession the first fire of six ships, which ought to cripple herand confuse her line.Suffren also notes the intention to double on the rear by placing three ships to leeward ofit.Two of the French did take this position.Suffren further gives his reason for not closing with his own ship,which led; but as those which followed him went no nearer, Hughes's attention was not drawn to his action.CHAPTER XII.EVENTS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1781.-SUFFREN SAILS FROM 195 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783The French commodore was seriously, and it would seem justly, angered by the inaction of several of hiscaptains.Of the second in command he complained to the minister: Being at the head, I could not well seewhat was going on in the rear.I had directed M.de Tromelin to make signals to ships which might be nearhim; he only repeated my own without having them carried out. This complaint was wholly justified.On the6th of February, ten days before the fight, he had written to his second as follows: If we are so fortunate as to be to windward, as the English are not more than eight, or at most nine, myintention is to double on their rear.Supposing your division to be in the rear, you will see by your positionwhat number of ships will overlap the enemy's line, and you will make signal to them to double (1) [that is, toengage on the lee side].In any case, I beg you to order to your division the manoeuvres which you shallthink best fitted to assure the success of the action.The capture of Trincomalee and that of Negapatam, andperhaps of all Ceylon, should make us wish for a general action. 1
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